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One of the fundamental principles of the criminal law is consistency: like offenders must be 
treated alike. However, research has shown that when it comes to sentencing in New Zealand 
there is in fact substantial regional disparity in the penalty imposed on similarly situated 
offenders. The situation is unacceptable, and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice 
system. This paper will explore three different mechanisms for guiding judicial discretion in 
the pursuit of sentencing consistency. It will undertake an analysis of mandatory sentences 
and the ‘instinctive synthesis’ approach, both of which will be shown to be unsatisfactory. 
Instead, the paper will argue that the establishment of a Sentencing Council with a mandate 
to draft presumptively binding guidelines is the most appropriate way forward for New 
Zealand. This option finds the correct equilibrium between giving a judge sufficient 
discretion to tailor a sentence that is appropriate in the circumstances of the individual case, 
yet limiting discretion enough to achieve consistency between cases.  
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I Introduction 
 
Sentencing […] is founded upon two premises that are in perennial conflict: individualized 
justice and consistency. The first holds that courts should impose sentences that are just and 
appropriate according to all of the circumstances of the particular case. The second holds that 
similarly situated offenders should receive similar sentencing outcomes. The result is an 
ambivalent jurisprudence that challenges sentencers as they attempt to meet the conflicting 
demands of each premise.1 
 
Sentencing is a notoriously difficult component of the criminal justice system. It requires a 
judge to balance numerous complex and often competing considerations in order to arrive at a 
penalty that does justice in a particular case. To this end, judges have traditionally enjoyed 
considerable discretion to be able to tailor an appropriate sentence, subject to the maximum 
penalties prescribed by Parliament. However, this flexibility comes at the cost of another 
important principle of the criminal law: consistency. The more discretion a judge is allowed 
to exercise, the greater the risk of like offenders being treated differently. How to resolve this 
tension and find a suitable equilibrium is a problem faced by jurisdictions the world over. 
 
This paper will examine the extent of sentencing inconsistency in New Zealand, and 
investigate various approaches to guiding judicial discretion in the imposition of criminal 
penalties. It will begin by analysing the importance of the consistency principle itself, with a 
particular focus on the effect parity has on public confidence in the judiciary. If similar 
offenders are not treated alike then the community begins to view the courts as unfair, which 
in turn jeopardises the ongoing legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Ensuring that there 
are adequate mechanisms in place to achieve sentencing consistency is therefore of 
fundamental importance to our system of law.   
 
In New Zealand, these mechanisms take two forms: the principles and purposes of sentencing 
found under the Sentencing Act 2002, and guideline judgments issued by the Court of 
Appeal. On analysis these will be shown to be inadequate. Studies have revealed that there is 
still substantial inconsistency in sentencing across geographic locations, particularly in 
relation to the less serious offences which form the bulk of the cases dealt with by the District 
                                                             
1 Sarah Krasnostein and Arie Freiberg “Pursuing Consistency in an Individualist Sentencing Framework: If You 
Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know When You’ve Got There?” (2013) 76 Law and Contemp. 
Probs 265 at 265.  
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Courts on a daily basis. The purposes and principles of sentencing set out in the Sentencing 
Act are too broad, and are simply a restatement of the common law position. Guideline 
judgments are more effective, but suffer from several systemic and constitutional limitations. 
Both the Law Commission and the Minister of Justice have called the situation 
unsatisfactory, which is something of a euphemistic understatement given the aforementioned 
importance consistency has on the wider legitimacy of the system. Policy adjustments are 
clearly required, and the paper will examine three different approaches that the legislature 
could adopt in order to achieve greater consistency in sentencing.  
 
If the amount of discretion a judge enjoys could be placed on a spectrum, at one end would 
lie mandatory sentences. Mandatory sentences could ensure consistency in sentencing by 
legislatively removing discretion entirely. However, because the facts of any given case are 
unique, this approach inevitably comes at the cost of individualised justice. It will become 
apparent that the practical effect of such an approach would be to remove discretion from 
judges and place it instead in the hands of police and prosecutors, as it would be their choice 
of charge laid that determines the offender’s sentence. This raises issues around transparency 
and accountability, leading to the conclusion that the adoption of mandatory sentences would 
cause more problems than it could potentially solve. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum lies the ‘intuitive synthesis’ approach, a doctrine that 
removes constraints on judicial discretion entirely, giving the sentencing judge a wide scope 
to balance the innumerable factors that make up an individual case and come to a decision 
that is holistically appropriate in all the circumstances. This approach has been adopted in 
Australia and Canada, and is underpinned by the belief that there is no objectively ‘right’ 
sentence. However, it will be argued that the doctrine would be a retrograde step for New 
Zealand, because it both masks, and in many respects normalises, disparity. 
 
The appropriate way forward for New Zealand is to adopt a mechanism that falls within the 
above two extremes. Discussion will therefore turn to the implementation of a Sentencing 
Council, a body comprised of experts and judges with a mandate to issue presumptively-
binding sentencing guidelines. Such a Council exists on the statute books in New Zealand,2 
but has not been established in practice. Because the body would be in a position to undertake 
                                                             
2 Sentencing Council Act 2007. 
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extensive research and consultation, it can in turn provide coherence to sentencing policy as a 
whole, as well as give the Government enhanced control of its Corrections budget. Several 
constitutional issues have been raised about the existence of such a body, including that it 
impinges on judicial independence and is an affront to the separation of powers, but these 
will be shown to be overstated. The only real concern is ensuring that it has widespread 
judicial support, something that is critical to its ongoing success. However, it is unlikely that 
the implementation of a Sentencing Council would spark widespread revolt within the 
judiciary, especially amongst the District Court judiciary whom it is particularly aimed to 
assist. The paper will therefore conclude that the establishment of a Sentencing Council is the 
most appropriate mechanism for guiding judicial discretion and ensuring consistency within 
the justice system. 
 
II Importance of Consistency in Sentencing 
 
Consistency in sentencing is of fundamental importance to the criminal justice system, and 
has accordingly been afforded statutory recognition in New Zealand under s 8(e) of the 
Sentencing Act 2002. What is needed is parity: like offenders must be treated alike, a maxim 
that has its origins in the works of Aristotle.3 If offenders are not treated alike, then the Court 
of Appeal has acknowledged that the resulting disparity “can result in injustice to an accused 
person and may raise doubts about the even-handed administration of justice”.4 Conversely, 
dissimilar cases should not be treated in a like fashion. Both of these situations would lead to 
injustice and erode public confidence in the legal system.5.  
 
The importance of maintaining this confidence cannot be overstated. Victims and witnesses 
will only co-operate with police and prosecutors if they trust the system and the professionals 
– including judges – with whom they have contact.6 That trust will quickly diminish if the 
public perceives the system to be inconsistent in its outcomes and thus unfair. On an abstract 
level, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system more broadly hinges on public support, 
and this needs to be earned. As Professor Julian Roberts notes, a central part of earning 
                                                             
3 See C.J. Rowe and Darah Broadie (eds) Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2002). 
4 R v Morris [1991] 3 NZLR 641 (CA) at 645. 
5 R v Lawson [1982] 2 NZLR 219 (CA) at 223; and Niamh Maguire “Consistency in Sentencing” (2010) 2 
Judicial Studies Institute Journal 14 at 39. 
6 Julian Roberts “Public Confidence in Criminal Justice: A Review of Recent Trends 2004 – 2005” (Report for 
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, 2004) at 1. 
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legitimacy is to maintain notions of fairness and integrity.7 Sara Benesh characterises the 
need for confidence slightly differently, saying that in order for the rule of law to remain 
operative, “citizens need to trust the institution charged with its keeping”.8 Parity in 
sentencing is underpinned by the rule of law, a doctrine which requires both the absence of 
arbitrary power and the need for fixed and predictable laws.9 The existence and imposition of 
inconsistent sentences indicates that judges may be exercising their discretion in an arbitrary 
fashion, making it impossible for the citizenry to foresee the consequences of their actions.  
 
Although consistency is an important principle in any jurisdiction that gives weight to the 
rule of law, its enforcement needs to be given special emphasis in those countries that 
maintain high levels of incarceration. This includes New Zealand, a nation that has 
traditionally sat at the more punitive end of the sentencing spectrum. As at 30 June 2014, 
New Zealand had 6754 people serving a sentence of imprisonment, with a further 1817 
inmates on remand,10 representing an incarceration rate of approximately 190 per 100,000 of 
population.11 This is higher than a number of comparable jurisdictions, including Australia 
(170 per 100,000 as at June 2013),12 Canada (113 per 100,000 as at August 2014) and the 
United Kingdom (149 per 100,000 as at August 2014).13 Indeed, the only major Western 
nation with a higher incarceration rate than New Zealand is the United States, which tips the 
scales at an astonishing 707 prisoners per 100,000 of population.14 Any criminal justice 
system that is forced to sentence such high volumes of offenders inherently leaves itself 
exposed to greater levels of inconsistency.  
 
The reason behind this is that consistency is required at two levels: individual consistency for 
the particular judge dealing with like offenders who appear before them; but also consistency 
between judges generally in dealing with like cases within the same jurisdiction.15 The more 
                                                             
7 Roberts, above n 6, at 1. 
8 Sara Benesh “Understanding Public Confidence in American Courts” (2006) 68 Journal of Politics 697 at 697. 
9 Joseph Raz “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in Aileen Kavanagh and John Oberdiek (eds) Arguing About 
Law  (Routledge, Abingdon, 2013) 181 at 183 
10 Department of Corrections “Prison Facts and Statistics – June 2014” <www.corrections.govt.nz>.  
11 Statistics New Zealand “National Population Estimates: At 30 June 2014” (14 August 2014) 
<www.stats.govt.nz>. 
12 Australian Bureau of Statistics “Australian prisoner numbers reach 30,000 for the first time” (press release, 5 
December 2013). 
13 International Centre for Prison Studies “Highest to Lowest – Prison Population Rate” 
<www.prisonstudies.org>. 
14 International Centre for Prison Studies, above n 12. 
15 Geraldine Mackenzie “Achieving Consistency in Sentencing: Moving to Best Practice?” (2002) 22 U. 
Queensland L.J. 74 at 75 
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cases being heard in that jurisdiction, the more difficult it is to ensure that the same 
sentencing practices are being followed. While we can expect a judge to be personally 
consistent in his or her approach to sentencing, the difficulty arises when trying to achieve 
consistency between adjudicators. Judges are endowed with significant discretion to tailor a 
sentence that is appropriate and does justice in the circumstances of the particular case. But 
what is an appropriate sentence? Opinions will clearly differ. Parliament is therefore left with 
the “significant challenge” of regulating judicial discretion in such a way that can balance the 
need for consistency with the reality that cases are unique and require individualised justice.16 
 
III Guiding Judicial Discretion 
 
Once the legislature has prescribed the maximum penalty for an offence, judges in New 
Zealand do not have carte blanche to impose any sanction they see fit. In order to promote 
consistency between cases their discretion is guided by two mechanisms: the purposes and 
principles set out under ss 7 and 8 of the Sentencing Act 2002; and guidelines judgments 
issued by the appellate courts. In practice, the former provides little practical assistance, and 
the latter suffers from a number of systemic limitations.   
 
1 Purposes and Principles of Sentencing  
 
In 1997, the Ministry of Justice issued a discussion paper entitled ‘Sentencing Policy and 
Guidance’, part of which looked specifically at the different possible methods for guiding 
judicial sentencing discretion.17 It put forward a number of options ranging from mandatory 
sentences,18 right through to a fully comprehensive sentencing information system that would 
provide judges with empirical sentencing data pertaining to offence subcategories.19 The 
drafters of the Sentencing Act chose to implement a general statement of sentencing purposes 
and principles, along with a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating factors, all of 
which can now be found in ss 7, 8 and 9 respectively of the Act. This was the loosest possible 
form of control on sentencing discretion that the Ministry could implement.20 The Law 
                                                             
16 Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts (eds) Principles Sentencing: Readings on Theory 
and Policy (3rd ed, Hart Publishing, Portland, 2009) at 229. 
17 Ministry of Justice “Sentencing Policy and Guidance – A Discussion Paper” (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 
1997), at [11].  
18 At [11.3]. 
19 At [11.7.1]. 
20 John Ip “Sentencing Guidelines post-Sentencing Act” [2005] NZLJ 397 at 399. 
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Commission described it as a “significant change to [the] traditional approach” to 
sentencing,21 although other commentators have been more reserved in their praise.22 John Ip 
doubts whether the changes have had any significant effect on sentencing discretion at all, 
saying that:23 
 
 Given the level of generality at which the sentencing purposes and principles are 
expressed, and given they can frequently suggest contradictory outcomes, it seems naïve 
in retrospect to have expected anything more. 
 
This criticism is not unwarranted. Many of the sentencing principles listed in the Act are self-
evident. As Roberts rightly notes, “no judge in New Zealand needs to be told, for example, 
that the maximum penalty should only be imposed for the most serious cases, although that is 
the direction contained in section 8(c)”.24 Nor do the purposes of sentencing offer any 
practical assistance in the application of discretion, as judges “remain free to ‘pick and mix’ 
from among the purposes, according to their pre-existing individual preferences”.25 The result 
is an unusual situation whereby the sentencing judge has the discretion to choose which 
principle or purpose to adopt as a means to guide their discretion.  
 
Furthermore, the legislature has codified such an extensive number of sentencing rationales 
that they often contradict each other in practice. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, 
there being an inherent difficulty in imposing a sentence that provides for both the interests of 
the victim26  and the offender’s rehabilitation and reintegration.27 Professor Geoff Hall claims 
that “the legislature has failed to develop a coherent sentencing policy from the theories of 
punishment that comprise this country’s penal philosophy and jurisprudence of sentencing”.28 
The irony is that the Ministry of Justice explicitly acknowledged the flaws in implementing a 
range of equally weighted sentencing purposes, and the inevitable problems they would cause 
in the discretionary environment in which they have to operate.29 The rationale for 
implementing them anyway was that “no one goal on its own provides a sufficient basis on 
                                                             
21 Law Commission Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform (NZLC R94, 2006) at [30]. 
22 See Julian Roberts “Sentencing Reform in New Zealand: An Analysis of the Sentencing Act 2002” (2003) 
ANZ J of Crim 249. 
23 Ip, above n 20, at 10. 
24 Roberts, above n 22, at 257. 
25 Roberts, above n 22, at 256. 
26 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(1)(c). 
27 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(1)(h).  
28 Geoff Hall Sentencing Law and Practice (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2004) at [1.3]. 
29 Ministry of Justice, above n 17, at [3.6]. 
7 
 
which to provide a coherent and comprehensive sentencing regime,” because which purpose 
to invoke is dependent on the individual circumstances of the offence and the offender.30 This 
may be true, but it incorrectly assumes that there are only two alternatives to choose from: the 
implementation of a single rationale of sentencing; or the implementation of a range of 
equally weighted rationales. As Professor Andrew Ashworth notes, there is a middle ground 
whereby the legislature can “declare a primary rationale, and provide that in certain types of 
case one or another rationale might be given priority”.31 This is the position in Sweden, and 
was the position in England under the Criminal Justice Act 1991, where desert theory was the 
primary rationale but with incapacitation having priority in certain types of cases. However, 
this approach was later abandoned for the same ‘pick and mix’ style currently found in New 
Zealand.32 
 
Without a clearly defined hierarchy of sentencing rationales, the current smorgasbord of 
purposes and principles found under the Sentencing Act are of little practical assistance to 
sentencing judges.  
 
2 Guideline Judgments 
 
Given the effective failure of the Sentencing Act to guide the application of judicial 
discretion, commentators such as Ip believe that the sentencing guideline judgments (also 
known as tariff judgments) issued by the Court of Appeal are a superior means of ensuring 
discretion is applied consistently in the criminal sentencing context.33  This view is echoed by 
the Law Commission which, despite having some sympathy for the Sentencing Act, conceded 
that ss 7 and 8 “provide little or no assistance in determining the ‘tariff’ custody threshold or 
sentence length appropriate for the average case of each type coming before the courts”.34  
 
Guideline judgments issued by the appellate courts provide authoritative guidance on how to 
approach sentencing for particular types of offences. These judgments generally set out 
sentencing ‘bands’ of escalating seriousness depending on the number and nature of 
                                                             
30 Geoff Hall and Stephen O’Driscoll “The New Sentencing and Parole Acts” (New Zealand Law Society 
Seminar Paper, 2002) at 17. 
31 Andrew Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (4th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) at 
[3.3.1]. 
32 Ashworth, above n 31.  
33 Ip, above n 20, at 10.  
34 Law Commission, above n 21, at [32]. 
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aggravating factors relating to the offending. The Court gives examples of the types of 
aggravated features that fall within each band, and sets a range of sentencing starting points 
for each.35 Subsequent judges can then slot the case before them into one of the bands of the 
appropriate guideline judgment, before individualising the sentence with a consideration of 
the relevant mitigating factors that arise on the facts. Guidelines judgments exist for a range 
of serious offences, including (but not limited to) aggravated robbery,36 sexual violation,37 
grievous bodily harm,38 and various categories of manslaughter cases.39  
 
These Court of Appeal decisions have a number of benefits for the application of judicial 
discretion. They offer the sentencing judge a single source to refer to as a point of reference, 
saving them from having to consult “the typical scattered and unrelated source[s] of 
guidance”.40 Indeed, in 2003 the Chief Justice and Chief District Court Judge issued a 
Practise Note requiring counsel to cite Court of Appeal guideline decisions in their 
sentencing memoranda where one was available.41  Assuming there is a guideline decision on 
point, “references to other decisions will not be of assistance”.42 Furthermore, guideline 
judgments give an indication of how the Court of Appeal might rule should the sentence be 
appealed, but at the same time leaves the trial judge with sufficient scope to tailor a sentence 
suitable for the individual circumstances of the case being heard.43  
 
Although guideline judgments are intended to achieve consistency, Miller J has noted that 
they still need to be flexible enough “not to circumscribe the discretion of the sentencing 
judge”.44 This is why guideline judgments act only as a starting point. Once the starting point 
is established, the sentencing judge can adjust the sentence depending on the applicable 
aggravating and mitigating factors of the offence and offender.45 O’Regan J in R v Taueki 
went to significant lengths to emphasise this point, highlighting the need to avoid a “rigid or 
mathematical approach”.46 Ip characterises this as a judicial fear of the “pendulum swinging 
                                                             
35 Law Commission, above n 21, at [37]. 
36 R v Mako [2000] 2 NZLR 170 (CA). 
37 R v AM [2010] NZCA 114. 
38 R v Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 (CA). 
39 For example, Kepu v R [2011] NZCA 104 discusses single punch manslaughter.  
40 Hall, above n 28, at [1.2.2(c)].  
41 Sentencing Practise Note 2003 [2003] 2 NZLR 575. 
42 At [2.2(h)].  
43 Hall, above n 28, at [1.2.2(c)].  
44 R v Patea-Glendinning [2006] DCR 505 at [58]; see also R v Mako [2000] 2 NZLR 170 (CA) at [60]. 
45 R v Mako [2000] 2 NZLR 170 (CA) at [62]. 
46 R v Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 (CA) at [16]. 
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from judicial discretion to judicial inflexibility,”47 but states that guideline judgments strike a 
balance between consistency and individualised justice.48 
 
Despite these advantages, guideline judgments suffer from several major flaws. The first is 
that such judgments only exist for the most serious offences on the criminal calendar, with 
the appellate courts providing no guidance on the use of discretion for the mass of less 
culpable offences dealt with daily in the lower courts.49 They almost exclusively deal with 
offences that warrant a term of imprisonment and as a result, “guidance as to the custody 
threshold or the use of community-based sentences is very limited”.50 This is of particular 
concern given that inconsistency is more likely to occur at those lower levels of offending. It 
also means that the Court of Appeal is unable to “give coherence to sentencing as a whole,”51 
because if the Court wishes to issue a guideline on a particular offence, it must wait until an 
appropriate case reaches it. This problem is compounded by the lack of input and expertise of 
the District Court judiciary, who are responsible for the vast bulk of sentencing in New 
Zealand.52   
 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal is inherently ill-placed to undertake the sort of systematic 
research required to guide meaningful sentencing policy. It does not have the resources or 
time to undertake substantive empirical research, nor can it investigate the wider impact of 
sentencing policy like the legislature can.53 As Dr Warren Young notes, because sentencing 
severity levels are determined without any consideration of financial costs and benefits, 
punishment therefore becomes the only item on the government’s agenda that is a “free 
good” – or in other words, it does not have to compete for funding in the same way other 
elements of the criminal justice system does (e.g. policing).54 This, according to the Law 
Commission, is an untenable position. They dismissed the argument that it is improper for 
fiscal considerations to constrain the imposition of an appropriate punishment, asserting that 
such a theory assumed that there is in fact a “right” punishment in any given case to start 
                                                             
47 Ip, above n 20, at 399. 
48 At 399. 
49 Hall, above n 28, at [1.2.2(c)]. 
50 Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Sentencing (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [SAC6]. 
51 Hall, above n 28, at [1.2.2(c)]. 
52 Law Commission, above n 21, at [39]. 
53 Law Commission, above n 21, at [39]. 
54 Warren Young “Sentencing Reform in New Zealand: A Proposal to Establish a Sentencing Council” in Arie 
Freiberg and Karen Gelb (eds) Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy (Willan Publishing, 
Devon, 2008) 179 at 184. 
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with.55 “In reality,” the Law Commission says, “punishment levels are a matter of values, and 
costs are one of the relevant factors informing those values”.56  
 
Public debate should inform these values, and should not be left to the whim of the unelected 
judiciary. This highlights the democratic deficit inherent in guideline judgments. If 
Parliament wishes to alter sentencing levels, it only has recourse to the blunt tool of 
amending maximum penalties in the hope that this will have a trickle-down effect on the 
ordinary run of cases.57 This is an inherently unusual impediment on Parliament’s supremacy 
to determine such a critical area of what is essentially social policy. Sentencing should (to at 
least some minimum extent) be determined by Parliament as an elected body representing the 
people, not by judges “who must of necessity distance themselves from the political and 
public debate that swirls around that policy”.58 
 
Finally, guidelines judgments are predominantly obiter dicta. It is impossible for an appellate 
judge to make general sentencing policy without this being so, as only comments relevant to 
reaching a decision in the case at hand form binding precedent.59  In theory, this allows 
sentencing judges to follow divergent lines of authority, or distinguish their case on the facts 
to circumvent guideline judgments.  
 
IV Empirical Evidence of Disparity in Sentencing 
 
Disparity is inevitable when judges are endowed with unchecked discretion. This was 
acknowledged by the architects of the Sentencing Act, with the Justice and Electoral 
Committee noting that without clear sentencing guidelines there is an increased risk of judges 
handing down different sentences for like offenders.60 Judges are only human, and will 
analyse a case consistent with their personal beliefs and experiences. Hall aptly articulates 
this weakness:61 
 
                                                             
55 Law Commission, above n 21, at [45]. 
56 At [45]. 
57 Young, above n 54, at 182. 
58 Young, above n 54, at 182. 
59 Law Commission, above n 21, at [39].  
60 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2001 (17-3) (select committee report) at 1. 
61 Hall, above n 28, at [2.1]. 
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Sentencing is not a rational mechanical process; it is a human process and subject to all 
the frailties of the human mind. A wide variety of factors, including the Judge’s 
background, experience, social values, moral outlook, penal philosophy and views as to 
the merits or demerits of a particular penalty influence the sentencing decision. 
 
This has been proven empirically. Writing in 1991, Hall examined a number of studies that 
highlight sentencing discrepancies.62  For example, a report commissioned by the then 
Department of Justice found that there were significant regional differences in custodial 
sentences for seven of the eight offence types analysed, which were “most likely caused by 
differences in the severity of sentencing by judges in different court areas.63 This was 
corroborated by a 1990 study which concluded that “the court at which the charge [is] heard 
also affects the chance of conviction, the probability of imprisonment and the length of the 
prison sentence imposed”.64 These studies were undertaken before the passage of the 
principles and purposes of sentencing of the Sentencing Act, and while guideline judgments 
in New Zealand were still in their infancy.  
 
However, more recent studies also highlight a disparity in sentencing. Although New 
Zealand-based literature in this area is sparse, a 2003 study shows that sentencing judges 
exercise considerable leniency towards women in the length of sentences imposed.65 The 
Law Commission itself commissioned a report that investigated regional variations in District 
Court sentencing,66 which showed that across the five offence types selected,67 some regions 
were systematically more severe than others. This study was viewed with trepidation by 
Priestley J, who indicated that some degree of discrepancy was inevitable if you properly left 
the judiciary discretion to formulate individualised sentences.68 Indeed, the Law 
Commission’s study was methodologically limited and unable to control for other factors that 
may lead to disparity.  
                                                             
62 Geoff Hall “Reducing Disparity by Judicial Self-Regulation: Sentencing Factors and Guideline Judgments” 
(1991) 14 NZULR 208.  
63 P Spier An Examination of Regional Differences in the Use of Custodial Sentences in the District Courts 
(Unpublished report, Policy and Research Division Department of Justice, Wellington 1989) at 49. 
64 J Palmer “An Examination of Discretion and Disparity in Judicial Sentencing Behaviour” (Unpublished LL.B 
(Hons) research paper, University of Otago, 1990).  
65 Samantha Jeffries, Garth Fletcher and Greg Newbold “Pathways to Sex-Based Differentiation in Criminal 
Court Sentencing” (2006) 41 Criminology 329 at 347. 
66 Law Commission Regional Analysis of Variations in District Court Sentencing (NZLC MP0, 2006); and Law 
Commission Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform (NZLC R94, 2006) at Appendix. 
67 Grievous assault; theft; conversion; breach of community work; and driving under the influence.  
68 Justice John Priestley “Chipping Away at the Judicial Arm?” (Harkness Henry Lecture, University of 
Waikato, October 2009) at 33. 
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In 2013, Wayne Goodall and Russil Durrant published a paper that analysed the regional 
variations in sentencing for the offence of aggravated drink driving in New Zealand.69 It was 
found that “the circuit in which an offender is sentenced for aggravated drink driving 
significantly affects the likelihood of incarceration,” even when controlling for factors such 
as the seriousness of the offence and criminal history.70 They concluded that the existing 
mechanisms to address sentencing variability were flawed,71 and explicitly disproved 
Priestley J proposition that individualised sentences inherently required disparity, claiming 
that unjustified discrepancy still occurred even when controlling for the core sentencing 
factors that judges need to weigh up in order to achieve individualised justice.72 It is 
interesting to note that Goodall does not think that individual judges should not be blamed for 
this discrepancy. He says that they are simply working within the boundaries of the 
inadequate system as it currently exists - “they are left in a vacuum and they have no choice 
but to form their own rules”.73 This is consistent with the problems identified earlier: the 
ineffectiveness of sentencing principles and purposes to guide discretion, and a lack of 
guideline judgments for low-level offending. 
 
How can New Zealand remedy this grossly unsatisfactory situation? There exists a spectrum 
along which Parliament can circumscribe judicial discretion at greater or lesser levels. The 
rest of this paper will examine where on that spectrum the legislature should intervene, or to 
paraphrase Lord Bingham of Cornhill, how short a leash “the dragon of arbitrary discretion” 
should be given.74 At one end of this spectrum lies mandatory sentences, which would 
circumscribe discretion entirely. At the other, an ‘intuitive synthesis’ approach that gives 
sentencing judges an almost unfettered ability to impose whatever penalty they see fit to 
achieve justice in the individual case. The preferred outcome, not surprisingly, can be found 
somewhere in the middle.  
 
 
                                                             
69 Wayne Goodall and Russil Durrant “Regional Variation in Sentencing: The incarceration of aggravated drink 
drivers in the New Zealand District Courts” (2013) 46 ANZ J of Crim 422. 
70 At 441. 
71 At 444. Note that this study was limited to aggravated drink driving, and does not necessarily reflect 
sentencing practice more generally.  
72 At 441. 
73 New Zealand Law Society “Stark Difference in Sentencing Identified” LawTalk (online ed, 11 October 2013).   
74 Lord Justice Bingham “The Discretion of the Judge” (1990) 5 Denning L.J. 27 at 28. 
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V Mandatory Sentences 
 
The introduction of mandatory sentences would be a simple way for the legislature to achieve 
consistency in sentencing. Strictly speaking, this involves setting a fixed penalty for the 
commission of a criminal offence, effectively removing judicial discretion at the sentencing 
stage entirely.75 New Zealand has several incidences of mandatory penalties, including life 
imprisonment for treason,76 and more recently the implementation of the Sentencing and 
Parole Reform Act 2010. Known colloquially as the ‘Three Strikes Law’, this Act requires a 
judge to impose the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for serious violent 
offending77 if the offender is being sentenced for a stage-3 offence (or, in other words, is on 
their ‘third strike’).78 Variants on the concept of mandatory sentencing can also include the 
imposition of mandatory minimum sentences, from which the court can then impose a more 
harsh sanction depending on the severity of the offending. While mandatory sentences have 
historically enjoyed some popularity, their widespread implementation in New Zealand is 
neither realistic nor desirable.  
 
1 Lack of Individualisation 
 
The first and most significant flaw of mandatory sentencing is that like offenders will not be 
treated alike. It is a long established principle of the criminal law that all of the circumstances 
of the offence and the offender should be taken into account in order for a judge to tailor a 
sentence that is appropriate in the individual case.79 A rigid system that removes judicial 
discretion through the use of mandatory sentences may technically succeed in its goal of 
achieving consistency, but it would come at the expense of individual justice.  
 
When the Attorney-General vetted New Zealand’s ‘Three Strikes’ legislation for compliance 
with the Bill of Rights Act, he noted that the regime “may result in gross disproportionality in 
                                                             
75 Declan Roche “Mandatory Sentencing” (1999) 138 Australian Institute of Criminology at 1. 
76 Crimes Act 1961, s 74(1). 
77 Section 86A of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides an exhaustive list of what qualifies as a “serious violent 
offence”. 
78 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86D. 
79 James Spigelman, Chief Justice of New South Wales “Consistency and Sentencing” (Keynote address to 
Sentencing 2008 Conference, National Judicial College of Australia, Canberra, 8 February 2008). 
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sentencing,”80 and on that basis was inconsistent with the right not to be subject to 
disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.81 This is an inevitable problem of all 
mandatory sentences. A wide assortment of conduct can fall within any defined offence, 
ranging from minimally culpable conduct that may result in a discharge,82 right through to 
conduct that is so serious that it warrants a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum 
prescribed for the offence. Where then should Parliament set the quantum of any mandatory 
sentence?  
 
The shape of a criminal justice system will be dependent on the political and social context 
within which it has to operate, with sentencing in particular being described by one former 
Minister of Justice as a “social battleground”.83 As a result, the question of quantum cannot 
be divorced from an analysis of the influence penal populism has had on the country. This 
has resulted in increasingly punitive rhetoric and policies from successive Governments, and 
as identified earlier, one of the highest incarceration rates in the Western world. In 1999 New 
Zealanders voted overwhelmingly in favour (91.75%) of a Citizens Initiated Referendum 
instigated by Norm Withers, which asked: ‘Should there be a reform of our justice system 
placing greater emphasis on the needs of victims, providing restitution, and compensation for 
them, and imposing minimum sentences and hard labour for all serious violent offenders?’ 
Despite the leading nature of the question and the conflation of several distinct issues, 
politicians have since used it as a mandate to push for longer sentences,84 even though the 
crime rate had in fact been decreasing since 1991, and has continued to decrease through into 
the 21st century:85 
 
 
                                                             
80 “Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Bill” (Published by order of the House of Representatives, 2009).  
81 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 9. 
82 Sentencing Act 2002, s 108. 
83 Geoffrey Palmer Reform: A Memoir (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2013) at 323 
84 John Pratt and Maria Clarke “Penal populism in New Zealand” (2005) 7 Punishm. Soc. 303 at 306. 
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The power and influence wielded by hard-line law and order lobby groups such as the 
Sensible Sentencing Trust (SST) exacerbates the problem of penal populism. Pratt describes 
politicians as “running to catch up with [the SST’s] demands”,86 and in 2010, Prime Minister 
John Key gave a speech at the SST conference praising the organisation as “courageous 
advocates for victims of crime” who play a “pivotal role in promoting a safer New 
Zealand”.87 Such dialogue is a blatant attempt by politicians to demonstrate their law and 
order credentials, and to foster a reputation for being ‘tough on crime’. It results in a situation 
whereby political parties attempt to outbid each with increasingly punitive policies,88 in order 
to appease a public who grossly overestimates the level of offending in society.89 
Furthermore, the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system gives significant influence to 
smaller ‘fringe’ parties, who are able to push through their law and order policies in exchange 
for giving larger political parties the numbers to govern.90 All these factors contribute 
towards a political culture that would almost certainly lead the Government to take a hard-
line approach when determining the quantum of mandatory sentences.  
 
Incredibly, New Zealand’s ‘Three Strikes’ legislation as it currently stands would not achieve 
consistency anyway – indeed, it actively prevents it. Take for example the current sentencing 
regime for the offence of sexual violation, as articulated in the guideline judgment of R v 
AM.91 The first ‘band’ of sentencing for sexual violation set out by the Court of Appeal 
recommends a sentence of between 6 – 8 years, and is appropriate for offending where there 
are no aggravating factors.92 This is consistent with the sentences imposed in R v Pehi93 and 
R v Hill.94 However, an offender who commits sexual violation in circumstances similar to 
the defendants in these two cases, but who happens to be on his or her third ‘strike’, would be 
sentenced to a term of 20 years, with a presumption that it would be served without parole.95 
There is clearly no consistency here. While there is some credibility in the argument that a 
                                                             
86 At 306. 
87 John Key, Prime Minister of New Zealand “Speech to Sensible Sentencing Trust Conference” (Parliament 
Buildings, Wellington, 25 August 2010). 
88 Palmer, above n 83, at 613. 
89 See Judy Paulin, Wendy Searle and Trish Knaggs Attitudes to Crime and Punishment: A New Zealand Study 
(prepared for the Ministry of Justice 2003). 
90 John Pratt “Penal Scandal in New Zealand” in Arie Freiberg and Karen Gelb (eds) Penal Populism, 
Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy (Willan Publishing, Devon, 2008) 31 at 38. 
91 R v AM [2010] NZCA 114. 
92 At [93]. 
93 R v Pehi CA86/06, 31 October 2006. 
94 R v Hill CA94/02, 21 October 2002. 
95 Crimes Act 1961, s 128B; Sentencing Act 2002, s 86D.   
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person on their third ‘strike’ has a history of serious violent offending that justifies a more 
punitive sentence, the court has no discretion to weigh this offending history to arrive at an 
outcome that is holistically appropriate in the circumstances. In this sense, the imposition of a 
mandatory sentence is an incredibly blunt, and often unfair, penalty. 
 
2 Reassignment of Discretion to Prosecutors 
 
The implementation of mandatory sentences would not eliminate discretion, it would merely 
give it to other actors in the criminal justice system, particularly to police and Crown 
prosecutors. By removing the discretion judges enjoy, these agencies would in effect get to 
decide who goes to prison and for what length of time, contingent on what charges they 
decided to lay.96  
 
Placing sentencing discretion in the hands of prosecutors causes a number of problems. A 
prosecutor, when deciding what charge is suitable, is not in a position to take into account all 
the relevant circumstances of the offence and the offender in the same way a judge can after 
the benefit of a sentencing hearing. When deciding what charge to lay, and by extension what 
sentence is appropriate, a prosecutor must rely on the often limited information provided by 
the police, and perhaps a brief dialogue with the offender’s defence counsel. Not only is this 
process substantively unsatisfactory when it comes to deciding on an appropriate sentence, 
but it also takes place behind closed doors and thus lacks transparency. In contrast, the 
sentencing decisions of judges subsequent to the exercise of their discretion are publically 
available,97 and there is legislative requirement that they provide reasons for the sentence 
they have imposed.98 This in turn allows a defendant to appeal their sentence, an important 
safeguard that is enshrined in the Bill of Rights Act,99 whereas a defendant is unable to 
appeal the prosecutor’s choice of charge laid. 
 
There is also clear evidence that prosecutors will change their behaviour in light of 
mandatory sentences in order to mitigate against unduly harsh outcomes. In the United States, 
in the context of mandatory minimum sentences, studies have shown that prosecutors are 
often reluctant to prosecute some offences due to the penalty being disproportionate to the 
                                                             
96 Rob White “10 arguments against mandatory sentencing” (2000) 19 Youth Studies Australia 22 at 23. 
97 Roche, above n 75, at 5. 
98 Sentencing Act 2002, s 31. 
99 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(h). 
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gravity of the offending.100 Due to the inflexibility of mandatory sentences, they will instead 
file charges for different, but roughly comparable, offences that are not subject to the 
mandatory sentencing regime.101 As a result, inconsistency will occur in not only the 
quantum of the sentence, but also in what charge is laid in the first place. Distortions in 
prosecutorial practice would be a real issue in New Zealand, as the Prosecution Guidelines 
issued by the Solicitor-General only require a prosecutor to ensure that the “charges filed 
adequately reflect the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”102 This very broad and 
subjective discretion provides plenty of scope for prosecutors to engage in the same attempts 
at mitigation as their American counterparts. 
 
3 Statutory Presumptions 
 
It is clear that the widespread implementation of mandatory sentences would be detrimental 
to the criminal justice system. The pursuit of consistency would come at the expense of 
fairness and proportionality, and would merely give greater discretion to prosecutors. 
However, another option would be for the legislature to create statutory presumptions as to 
what a sentence should be, with the ability of a judge to rebut that presumption and impose a 
shorter sentence if necessary.  
 
Such an approach currently exists for the offence of murder, where there is a legal 
presumption requiring a court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment unless, given the 
circumstances of the offence and the offender, such a sentence would be “manifestly 
unjust”.103 During the first reading of the Bill, the Minister of Justice said that the inclusion 
of a rebuttable presumption in s 102 would reduce the likelihood that a jury, in order to 
compensate for a lack of flexibility at sentencing,104 would return a verdict of manslaughter 
rather than murder. Once the court considers it manifestly unjust to impose a life sentence 
and accordingly rebuts the presumption, the full range of sentencing options under the 
                                                             
100 David Bjerk “Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion under Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing” (2005) 48 Journal of Law and Economics 591 at 594. 
101 Michael Tonry Sentencing Matters (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) at 147 
102 Crown Law Office “Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines as at 1 July 2013” (Crown Law Office, June 
28 2013) at [8.1]. 
103 Sentencing Act 2002, s 102. The sentencing regime is different if the murder is a stage-2 or stage-3 offence 
under s 86E of the Sentencing Act 2002.   
104 The Criminal Justice Act 1985 made life imprisonment for murder mandatory. The sentencing judge had no 
discretion to impose a lesser sentence. 
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Sentencing Act become available.105 The court will therefore have recourse to any sentence 
it thinks appropriate to fulfil the principles and purposes of sentencing.   
 
Rebuttable statutory presumptions would go some ways to achieving consistency in 
sentencing, whilst leaving judges with sufficient residual discretion to impose a lesser 
sentence when necessary. The key would be establishing a fair threshold at which the 
presumption can be displaced. In relation to murder, the threshold of manifest injustice is 
incredibly high, with Elias CJ indicating that it “is a conclusion likely to be reached in 
exceptional cases only”.106 Distinctions around culpability must instead be made when 
determining what minimum non-parole period to impose. However, this approach is less 
persuasive in relation to minor offences where the need to denounce the conduct is not as 
strong, and other principles and purposes of sentencing, such as the need to assist in the 
offender’s rehabilitation, are of greater importance. Nor does it remedy the underlying 
problem: impose a high threshold before a judge is authorised to depart from the 
presumption and the sentences imposed will not be able to reflect the varying culpability 
levels; impose a low threshold before and the same problems around the use of discretion 
apply.   
 
VI “Instinctive Synthesis” – An Individualised Approach to Sentencing 
 
If mandatory sentences sit at one extreme of any spectrum on how to guide judicial 
discretion, then the instinctive synthesis approach surely sits at the other. During the 
twentieth century, senior judges around the British Commonwealth began to adopt the view 
that sentencing was not an area that could be regulated by Parliament with mathematical 
precision or formulae, and that “all […] well-experienced judges could do was to agree on a 
range of sentences that could respectably be said to fit all the circumstances of the case”.107 
On this line of thinking, particular rules and mechanisms as to how judges should exercise 
their discretion are unnecessary and unhelpful, because there is no inherently ‘right’ sentence 
to impose. Indeed, Jordan CJ mused that “the only golden rule is that there is no golden 
rule”.108  
                                                             
105 R v Law (2002) 19 CRNZ 500 (HC) at [52]. 
106 R v Rapira [2003] 3 NZLR 794 (CA) at [121]. 
107 Justice Grant Hammond “Sentencing: Intuitive Synthesis or Structured Discretion?” (2007) NZ L. Rev. 211 
at 213. 
108 R v Geddes (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 554. 
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This liberal and individualist style of sentencing has found extensive support from the senior 
judiciary in both Australia and Canada. The Victorian Supreme Court in R v Williscroft first 
coined the notion of an “instinctive synthesis” approach to sentencing in 1975,109 a concept 
which has been cited and refined multiple times since,110 and which now refers to an exercise 
whereby “all relevant considerations are simultaneously unified, balanced and weighed by the 
sentencing judge”.111 The Australian High Court has explicitly said that there is no single 
correct sentence in any given case,112 and the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the act 
of sentencing is a “profoundly subjective process”.113 To this end, a judge does not need to 
explicitly lay out the reasons behind the sentence he or she arrives at, because all that matters 
is the sentence itself.114 It is the intuitive weight that a sentencing judge decides to place on 
the circumstances of the offence and the offender, after the benefit of hearing all the 
evidence, which is important – not the process of jumping through formulaic hoops set by the 
legislature. As a result, the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing has been 
characterised as “more art than science”.115 
 
However, other judges and commentators have viewed this approach with a degree of 
consternation, noting a number of significant flaws. Kirby J of the Australian High Court felt 
that the approach lacked transparency and was a “retrograde step”,116 because disclosure 
around how a particular sentence has been formulated and the reasons for that sentence 
should not be hidden by judicial reference to instinct or intuition, “which does little to 
provide any useful insight or engender public confidence in the task of sentencing”.117 Kirby 
took particular issue with the instinctive synthesis approach in the context of legislatively 
mandated discounts for guilty pleas, saying that without explicit judicial reasoning it is not 
possible to know whether the statutory discount provisions have been applied at all, and it 
becomes impossible to for appellate courts to check the sentence for consistency with like 
                                                             
109 R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292 at 300. 
110 See R v Markarian (2005) 215 ALR 213; Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; R v Morton (1986) 23 A 
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cases.118 Indeed, consistency itself is not of primary importance under the instinctive 
synthesis approach. In Wong v The Queen, Gleeson CJ noted that although criminal 
sentencing should not be seen as a “multiplicity of unconnected single instances”, a certain 
level of inconsistency is acceptable and inevitable.119 Because the approach eschews the use 
of any mechanisms that may guide discretion, Krasnostein and Frieberg go as far as to say the 
approach conceals and normalises disparity. They conclude that because judges do not need 
to explicitly set out the weight they give to certain factors when formulating their ‘intuitive’ 
decision, it becomes virtually impossible to assess whether like offenders are routinely 
treated in the same way. This in turn means that “sentences can be inconsistent within a 
(potentially vast) margin of error yet still legal”.120  
 
A further problem around the instinctive synthesis approach is the underlying need for a clear 
rationale of sentencing. Ashworth says that:121 
 
It is one thing to agree that judges should be left with discretion, so they may adjust the 
sentence to fit the particular combination of facts in the individual case. It is quite another to 
suggest that judges should be free to choose what rationale of sentencing to adopt in particular 
cases or types of case. Freedom to select from among the various rationales is a freedom to 
determine policy, not a freedom to respond to unusual combinations of facts. 
 
According to Ashworth, one of the major reasons for sentencing disparity are the different 
penal philosophies amongst judges and magistrates.122 This problem would be magnified 
exponentially in a situation whereby sentencing judges had unlimited discretion to impose 
a sentence according to their subjective intuition. Intuitions will invariably differ, and can 
be plagued by bias, ignorance and prejudice.123 A single, clearly defined sentencing 
rationale – such as rehabilitation or retribution – would ensure that judges are exercising 
their discretion in the pursuit of a common goal. However, in New Zealand (as in other 
jurisdictions) the Sentencing Act does not set out any single rationale of sentencing. It 
instead lists eight, equally weighted purposes of sentencing.124 As was identified earlier in 
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the paper, this is an unsatisfactory mechanism for guiding judicial discretion, because 
sentencing judges are free to choose whatever purpose they like to justify their imposed 
penalty depending on their pre-existing penal preferences. Hammond J has said that:125  
 
Before a judge can impose an appropriate sentence, that judge must be properly apprised of 
the purpose or purposes to which sentence is directed. And there should be some directions 
as to how to achieve that purpose. In the absence of a body of case law, or such legislation, 
gross disparities in sentence are inevitable. 
 
If New Zealand were to adopt the intuitive synthesis approach as a means of achieving 
consistency, it would therefore need to amend ss 6 and 7 of the Sentencing Act by making it 
clear what the primary or overriding purpose of sentencing is.  
 
There is nothing in the empowering legislation of New Zealand’s sentencing regime that 
restricts the adoption of the intuitive synthesis approach,126 subject to the repeal of certain 
mandatory provisions of the Sentencing Act. That said, the country lacks the appetite for such 
a method. New Zealand has to date followed the regulated approach of England, which is in 
sharp contrast to the individualised style found in Australia and Canada. There would need to 
be some major catalyst – possibly in the form of public discontent with the status quo – to 
overhaul the system in such a drastic fashion. However, public sentiment in the field of 
sentencing generally yearns for the twin aims of greater consistency and harsher sentences – 
both of which are brought about by less judicial discretion, not more.127 This in turn will 
hamper the political appetite to deregulate the sentencing sphere in the same way Australia 
and Canada have.  
 
The intuitive synthesis approach would lead to greater disparity in sentencing, make it more 
difficult for defendants to appeal their sentence, and would require the legislature to 
undertake the difficult task of settling on a clear purpose of sentencing.  Furthermore, there is 
no discernible appetite for its implementation in New Zealand. While it would undoubtedly 
be popular amongst those judges who view their sentencing discretion as sacrosanct, its only 
real benefit lies in its ability to give judges a wide ability to impose whatever sentence is 
necessary to achieve justice in a particular case. This, however, can be done without 
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removing guidance in the field of sentencing entirely. The implementation of a Sentencing 
Council is an effective compromise between the extremes of the instinctive synthesis 
approach and mandatory sentences, achieving an equilibrium which harnesses the benefits of 
both.  
 
VII The New Zealand Sentencing Council 
 
In February 2006, the Law Commission was asked by the Labour-led Government to 
examine the existing parole and sentencing structures in New Zealand. There were two major 
catalysts behind this project: the disparity of outcome between like offenders due to the the 
highly discretionary nature of New Zealand’s sentencing and parole arrangements;128 and the 
immense public dissatisfaction with the lack of ‘truth in sentencing’, or in other words, the 
perception that the system was unduly lenient because offenders were only serving a fraction 
of their sentence before being released on parole.129 This latter point was an issue of 
particular political sensitivity, especially given the political traction and media attention being 
enjoyed by the Sensible Sentencing Trust at this time.130 The significant difference between 
the head sentence imposed and the actual time served created a situation that the President of 
the Law Commission, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, said bordered on deception.131 
 
 On 11 August 2006 the Commission presented their findings to the Government, 
recommending (amongst other things) the establishment of a Sentencing Council with a 
mandate to draft sentencing guidelines.132 On 25 July 2007, by a majority of 70 to 51, the 
Sentencing Council Bill was read a third time in Parliament.133 It received royal assent within 
the week,134 with a date for the Council’s implementation in practice to be determined by 
Order in Council.135 To date, the Government has declined to establish the Sentencing 
Council, and has indicated that it will not be doing so in the future.136 For now, the 
Sentencing Council Act 2007 sits impotent on the statute books. 
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The Law Commission’s report and its recommendations involved intertwined amendments to 
both the sentencing and parole system. In many respects, it was the changes to parole that 
were of the most practical importance to the Government and interest to the public. These 
changes required an offender to serve two-thirds of their nominal sentence before becoming 
eligible for parole, up from what was universal parole eligibility after just one-third served.137 
The recommendations would also require the judge to make it clear in open court how much 
of a sentence would need to be served before the offender became eligible for parole.138 That 
said, this paper is interested in how the recommendations will effect consistency in 
sentencing, and as a result, the focus will be predominantly on the Sentencing Council and 
the guidelines it can issue.   
 
A Sentencing Guidelines 
 
The Sentencing Council has a mandate to draft sentencing guidelines, the purposes of which 
have been enshrined under s 8 of the Sentencing Council Act 2007 and include the need to 
promote consistency in sentencing practice between different courts and judges. Indeed, 
consistency was a prominent concern of the Law Commission’s when constructing their 
report, noting from the outset the need to ensure “that there is, at a minimum, a consistent 
judicial approach and a predictable pattern in sentence severity”.139  
 
In order to achieve consistency, the Sentencing Council could issue either narrative or 
numerical guidelines. Numerical guidelines would set out the nature and range of applicable 
penalties for an offence, indicating for example a range of appropriate fines or prison term 
length based on the severity of the offending. This is similar to the function of tariff 
judgments, which often set out sentencing bands that propose numeric starting points for 
judges to begin their sentencing analysis.140 While numerical guidelines have the benefit of 
simplicity, both for the comprehension of sentencing judges and the wider public, the Council 
will need to be careful to ensure that they do not become overly rigid, in turn restricting 
judges’ ability to achieve justice in a particular case. This is what has occurred in the United 
States. The Federal sentencing guidelines implement a numeric, two dimensional grid 
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through which a judge must calculate the appropriate sentence, with each axis of the grid 
having regard to offence seriousness and criminal history. This approach has been criticised 
at length by academics, lawyers and judges alike, all of whom argue that the system is 
fundamentally unable to take into account the complex array of factors that make up 
sentencing.141  
 
To ameliorate the risk of numerical guidelines becoming unduly restrictive, the New Zealand 
Sentencing Council would also be able to issue conjunctive narrative guidelines. Narrative 
guidelines offer a textual commentary, and in many respects would be an embellishment of 
the statutory commentary that already exists under the purposes and principles of the 
Sentencing Act.142 This sort of contextualisation has been considered essential in overseas 
jurisdictions, and is the approach that has been taken in the United Kingdom.143 At the lower 
end of the spectrum, these guidelines are likely to focus on and discuss the factors that are 
relevant to the custody threshold.144  
 
Any guidelines issued by the Council would have to work within the existing legislative 
framework.145 This means that the Council must adhere to the maximum penalties found in 
legislation, as well as the existing provisions of the Sentencing Act 2002, such as the 
purposes and principles of sentencing. It is not the role of the Council to recommend changes 
to maximum penalties, although theoretically it could tender advice to the Minister on such 
matters under s 25 of the Sentencing Council Act. Such advice would need to fall under the 
legislatively prescribed ambit of advice “on any sentencing or parole issue that relates to the 
development and use of sentencing guidelines”.146 
 
B Implementation of the Guidelines 
 
                                                             
141 See Judge Jed Rakoff “Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Should be Scrapped” (2013) 26 Federal 
Sentencing Reporter 6. 
142 Law Commission, above n 21, at [96]. 
143 Law Commission “Reforms to the Sentencing and Parole Structure: Consultation Draft” (Wellington, April 
2006) (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Law Commission). 
144 Law Commission, above n 21, at [96]. 
145 Sentencing Council Act 2007, s 9(1)(a). 
146 Sentencing Council Act 2007, s 25. 
25 
 
The Sentencing Council Act sets out a unique method of giving Parliamentary endorsement 
of the recommended guidelines.147 Once the Minister of Justice has been presented with the 
guidelines (as well as the statement of their likely effect on the prison population), he or she 
must table them in Parliament.148 They will then be referred to the appropriate select 
committee (almost certain to be the Law and Order committee), who have 15 days to table a 
report.149  From there, if Parliament then determines that the guidelines should not come into 
force, it has 15 days to disallow them by way of a negative resolution on a notice of 
motion.150 If this is not done then the guidelines would come into force 20 working days after 
the expiry of the specified disallowance period.151 If the guidelines are disapplied, they must 
be sent back to the Council for reconsideration. 
 
This negative resolution procedure ensures appropriate Parliamentary involvement in the 
imposition of guidelines, a mark of democracy that the Law Commission felt was important 
to ensure the guidelines’ legitimacy.152 To this end the President of the Law Commission 
sought input from David McGee QC, the Clerk of the House of Representatives.153 McGee 
broadly agreed with the Commission’s proposed negative resolution procedure, but suggested 
some minor changes. For example, it was originally suggested that the Leader of the House 
would move a motion referring the guidelines to an appropriate select committee for 
consideration, but McGee felt that this was unnecessary and that the Standing Orders could 
provide for the guidelines to automatically stand referred to a committee.154 In a submission 
to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee, McGee also expressed concern that the 
Criminal Justice Reform Bill explicitly set out the nature of the negative resolution process, 
even though it is an internal parliamentary process that does not need to be legislated for. He 
argued that:155  
 
                                                             
147 Although the process is broadly similar to the provisions found under s 109 of the Crown Entities Act 2004. 
148 Sentencing Council Act 2007, s 17. 
149 Law Commission, above n 21, at [113]. 
150 Sentencing Council Act 2007, s 19. 
151 Sentencing Council Act 2007, s 21. 
152 Law Commission, above n 21, at [112]. 
153 Letter from Sir Geoffrey Palmer (President of the Law Commission) to David McGee (Clerk of the House) 
regarding the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (5 April 2006) (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 
Request to the Law Commission). 
154 Letter from David McGee (Clerk of the House) to Sir Geoffrey Palmer (President of the Law Commission) 
regarding the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (26 April 2006) (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 
Request to the Law Commission). 
155 Letter from David McGee (Clerk of the House) to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee (15 May 2007) 
(Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Law Commission) (emphasis original). 
26 
 
All that is required is to make provision for the legal consequences if the House agrees – that is, 
resolves – on disallowance. How the House reaches the point of resolving (it might not employ 
a notice of motion at all, for example) is a matter for its internal procedures, its Standing 
Orders, not for legislation. 
 
This advice was broadly adopted by the committee, and distinct changes have been made 
between the Criminal Justice Reform Bill and the eventual Sentencing Council Act.  
 
In the original Bill, there was a statutory direction requiring the Sentencing Council to vary 
guidelines that were disallowed by Parliament, as opposed to their simply reconsidering 
them.156 Although there were no submissions on this point, the Law Commission later felt 
that the Council ought to retain the prerogative to refuse to alter its guidelines. This would 
likely only occur in rare circumstances, but it is important in maintaining the independent 
status of the Council, especially in light of the extensive judicial involvement.157 Similarly, 
Parliament does not have the power to amend the guidelines that are tabled before it. To do so 
would be to assume the role of the expert body it has already set up. If Parliament is 
dissatisfied with the guidelines, “the negative resolution procedure allows it to express this by 
rejection, but not by becoming the Sentencing Council itself”.158 
  
C The Council’s Role in Managing Penal Resources 
 
Consistency was not the only purpose of introducing sentencing guidelines. Under s 8(a)(iv), 
the guidelines must also “facilitate the provision of reliable information to enable penal 
resources to be effectively managed,”159 and the broader functions of the Council are to  
“assess and take account of the overall costs and benefits of the guidelines,”160 as well as 
provide a statement on the guidelines’ likely effect on the prison population.161As discussed 
earlier, one of the major flaws with the current sentencing system is that the Court of Appeal 
is ill-equipped to undertake the comprehensive empirical research necessary to guide 
sentencing policy. The Court issues guideline judgments, but it is unable to weigh up the 
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relative costs and benefits of its recommended sentencing levels and their corresponding 
impact on the prison population. Punishment, in effect, becomes a ‘free’ good. 
 
The use of the sentencing guidelines would entirely rectify this situation. Because the 
Sentencing Council would be required to undertake prison population modelling to assess the 
effect of its recommendations, the executive would in turn attain a significantly enhanced 
control of its Corrections budget.162 For the first time the Government (as opposed to the 
Court of Appeal) would be able to determine where sentencing levels should be set, giving it 
the opportunity to implement only those guidelines that are consistent with its broader aims in 
the law and order sector and with reference to budgetary constraints. Not only will this result 
in better informed policy, but the greater influence of Parliament also ensures that sentencing 
levels are democratically legitimate. It is worth noting too that in the United Kingdom, 
resource considerations and cost-effectiveness are not explicitly taken into account by the 
Sentencing Council. However, the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Queen’s Bench 
Division have both indicated that the system “would be improved if resource consideration 
were a more explicit part of the process”.163 
 
Some of the submissions on the Criminal Justice Reform Bill were concerned that the 
Council itself had a vested interest in reducing the imprisonment rate in New Zealand. This 
was in part due to the Bill’s explanatory note, which asserted that the purpose of the 
legislation was to “arrest the sharp increase in prison population” and “contribute to a 
reduction in the imprisonment rate over time”.164 One submission reasoned that such an 
intention is inappropriate, because there is the potential that the Council would issue 
guidelines that increases sentences, depending upon the composition and inclination of its 
members.165 This is entirely correct. The Law Commission later accepted that the explanatory 
note was “over-generalised,”166 and that in reality the Council’s role is more nuanced. 
Although overseas literature indicates that “when legislatures are required to make law and 
order choices in light of their predictable fiscal effects, prison population expansion tends to 
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be curbed or muted,” in practice the Council is able to produce guidelines that would 
maintain or even increase the number of people incarcerated.167  
 
D Composition of the Council 
 
The Council would comprise of ten members: one Judge of the Court of Appeal; one Judge of 
the High Court; two District Court Judges; the chairperson of the Parole Board;168 and five 
lay members.169 The Sentencing Council in the United Kingdom has twelve members, but the 
Director of Public Prosecutions has said that this is too big and is difficult to manage.170 
According to the Law Commission, ten is the optimum number to guarantee the Council is 
representative, but also small enough to ensure that it is cohesive, efficient and publicly 
credible.171  
 
Whether there needed to be a judicial majority on the Council was a key issue, and overseas 
commentators were divided as to the appropriate ratio for such bodies. For example, Michael 
Tonry believed that senior English judges would not co-operate with any issued guidelines 
unless the judiciary had control over the Council, but the United States experience showed 
that a purely judicial body would not create guidelines with “sufficient rigour” to achieve 
consistency.172 Consultation with the New Zealand judiciary indicated that a judicial majority 
would be unnecessary, in part due to the significant policy function of the Council, but that its 
membership needed to ensure that the guidelines are “tailored to the range of circumstances 
that confront sentencing judges on a daily basis”.173 It was decided that four judges plus the 
chairperson of the Parole Board, who by statute is also a judge,174 would ensure that the 
Council can fully appreciate the realities of sentencing in practice, and would instil wider 
judicial confidence in the system.175  
 
                                                             
167 Law Commission, above n 157, at [51]. 
168 The chairperson of the Parole Board gets a seat because of the Council’s function of also drafting parole 
guidelines, see s 9(1)(b). This aspect of the Sentencing Council’s jurisdiction falls outside the ambit of this 
essay. 
169 Sentencing Council Act 2007, s 10. 
170 Sentencing Guidelines Establishment Unit, above n 163, at [9]. 
171 Law Commission, above n 21, at [81]. 
172 Michael Tonry “Setting sentencing policy through guidelines” in Sue Rex and Michael Tonry Reform and 
Punishment: The Future of Sentencing (Willan Publishing, New York, 2002) 75 at 80.  
173 Law Commission, above n 21, at [83]. 
174 Parole Act 2002, s 112. 
175 Warren Young and Andrea King “Sentencing Practice and Guidance in New Zealand” (2010) 22 Federal 
Sentencing Reporter 254 at 258. 
29 
 
The input of District Court judges in particular allows the Council to draw on experience 
from those at the forefront of sentencing in New Zealand, rectifying one of the major 
problems associated with tariff judgments as a means of guiding judicial discretion. It is 
interesting to note that there is no restriction on the lower court judge from taking on the role 
of Chairperson, effectively placing him or her in a more senior position on the Council to 
their superior Court colleagues.176 However, the Chairperson would be appointed by the 
Chief Justice, who has already indicated her preference that a senior judge take the role.177 
The Criminal Justice Reform Bill originally required the Chairperson to be one of the non-
judicial members, but this was amended by the Justice and Electoral Select Committee after 
consultation with the judiciary, stating that “the appointment of a judicial chairperson would 
encourage judicial confidence in the Council, and would also be more likely to help the 
Council achieve one of its core purposes, consistency in sentencing”.178  
 
The judicial members would be appointed by their respective Head of Bench in consultation 
with the Chief Justice,179 presumably based on expertise or interest in the area.180 The 
remaining members would be appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of 
Parliament,181 with the Minister of Justice emphasising that their selection “is not an area 
where partisan considerations have any place”.182 Whether partisan preferences can be 
avoided in a political system blighted by penal populism is uncertain, with the Law Society 
expressing concern that the “membership of the Council could become politically 
contentious”.183 However, schedule 1(1) of the Act sets out the criteria Parliament should 
consider when recommending an appointment. This includes experience in: criminal justice 
matters, policing, the assessment of risk of reoffending, the effect of the criminal justice 
system on Maori and minority cultures, the promotion of the rights and welfare of victims of 
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crime, and public policy.184 In the original version of the Bill these were mandatory 
considerations that had to be taken into account by Parliament, but this was changed after the 
select committee felt it was too proscriptive and inhibited the ability of the House to regulate 
its own procedures.185  
 
During submissions on the Bill, various interest groups claimed that they should have 
mandatory representation on the Council. For example, the Royal Federation of New Zealand 
Justices’ Association argued that they should have a representative due to the “heavy 
involvement of Justices of the Peace […] at the lower end of the Court structure”.186 
However, if the Council is to remain at a workable size it is simply impractical to ensure that 
every interested party in the criminal justice system has a say. Appointments based on 
expertise in the area is flexible enough to ensure that a broad cross-section of lay people can 
contribute to the guidelines. Assuming that expressions of interest are widely publicised 
using a range of media, the system as it stands would also ensure that there is healthy 
competition to fill the vacant positions, in turn increasing the calibre of expertise on the 
Council. This was aptly articulated by the Law Commission, who said that “the quality of 
appointees to the Council and the resulting community confidence in them is a more 
important consideration than a desire for ‘representativeness’”.187 In any event, the Council is 
required to undertake extensive public consultation anyway,188 which is an appropriate 
mechanism to ensure that all interested parties have their views heard. 
 
Members would hold office for a term of five years,189 which can be extended to a term not 
exceeding seven years.190 If necessary, members of the Council can be removed or 
suspended. For the judicial members this is done via the same process that is required to 
remove them from office as a Judge.191 The lay members can be removed or suspended by 
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the Governor-General “on address from the House of Representatives, for inability to 
perform the functions of office, neglect of duty, or misconduct”.192 
 
E Departure from the Guidelines 
 
Although the guidelines exist to achieve greater consistency in sentencing across New 
Zealand, there will always be a risk that a judge may need to depart from the guidelines to 
achieve justice in a particular case. The Law Commission acknowledged this, stating that 
“the threshold beyond which judges passing sentence in individual cases would be permitted 
to depart from sentencing guidelines is clearly integral to their success”.193  
 
The Law Commission recommended a public interest test for departure, which requires a 
sentencing judge to “impose a sentence that is consistent with any sentencing guidelines that 
are relevant in the offender’s case, unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the 
interests of justice to do so”.194 A judge would need to justify their reasons for departing from 
a guideline,195  but it was forecast that departures would occur in no more than 20 percent of 
cases.196 This test can now be found in the legislation. 
 
However, the Justice and Electoral Committee did not immediately adopt the Commission’s 
recommendation, finding virtue instead in the United Kingdom’s formulation of the departure 
test. This merely requires the court to “have regard to any guidelines which are relevant to the 
offender’s case,”197 which is a much looser form of control over discretion. The Acting Chief 
Justice gave oral evidence to the Committee on this point, and said that judges’ (perhaps 
surprisingly) preferred the Commission’s more stringent approach.  This view was echoed by 
the Chief High Court Judge, but who added that so long as the guidelines were flexibly 
drafted, either formula would be acceptable. The Law Commission was less ambivalent, 
arguing that “a guideline that is purely advisory may not carry sufficient weight to effect a 
substantial change,” particularly given the levels of inconsistency present at the lower levels 
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of criminal sentencing.198 Furthermore, the implementation of guidelines that are merely 
advisory may be a regressive step, because at the moment the guideline judgments issued by 
the Court of Appeal are binding (by convention; despite being obiter dicta) on the lower 
courts. The Commission rightly indicated that replacing this position with the United 
Kingdom’s approach “could thus weaken the relative consistency that currently exists in 
sentencing for the most serious offences”.199 In other words, if the test for departure was too 
loose, or if the guidelines were only advisory in nature, the practical effect of the Sentencing 
Council may be to inadvertently create further inconsistency in the sentencing sphere. 
 
F Constitutional Uncertainties 
 
The Sentencing Council faced vehement criticism from opposition parties during its passage 
through Parliament. The National Party made it clear that it would repeal the legislation 
should it win the pending 2008 general election,200 with its concerns falling under two broad 
categories: that the Council impinged on judicial independence; and that its existence 
offended the doctrine of separation of powers.  
 
1 Judicial independence 
 
Underpinning National Party sentiment was the notion that constraining judicial discretion in 
sentencing with guidelines was an affront to judicial independence.201 This was echoed by 
organisations such as the Howard League for Penal Reform, who submitted that the Council 
“represents a departure from the convention of judicial independence […] its deliberations – 
sentencing guidelines – will inevitably curtail judicial discretion”.202 
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However, this represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of judicial 
independence. Justice Pankhurst, writing extra judicially, posited that:203  
 
Judges must maintain responsibility for the imposition of sentences in individual cases. In 
doing so, the constitutional independence of the judiciary is of fundamental importance. It 
provides the best assurance that sentences are not influenced by political or other 
considerations. But, the sentencing policy, or sentencing environment, under which individual 
sentences are imposed, is another matter. I would argue that sentencing policy is a concern of 
the entire community. 
 
Judicial independence extends simply to deciding cases “without fear or favour, affection or 
ill will”.204  Its importance in constitutional terms lies in the fact that judges need to be able to 
decide cases without interference from the other two branches of government.205 To this end, 
there exists constitutional protections around judicial tenure206 and remuneration.207 Judicial 
independence does not mean that it is exclusively for judges to determine the overarching 
sentencing framework.208 While historically judges have indeed had a broad and unregulated 
discretion in the field of sentencing,209 Parliamentary sovereignty makes it clear that such 
discretion can be constrained by the legislature setting maximum, mandatory or minimum 
sentences. It therefore follows that Parliament must have the power to implement sentencing 
guidelines of the kind in question, which simply further dictate the nature or range of 
penalties that can be implemented.210 The fact Parliament has not done so before this “is a 
matter of preference rather than constitutional principle”.211 It is interesting to note that 
consultation with the judiciary indicates that judges themselves do not view the Council as 
infringing on judicial independence in the way described.212  
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2 Separation of powers 
 
Of perhaps greater concern to the National opposition was the impact the Sentencing Council 
may have on the separation of powers. Christopher Finlayson MP opined that “from time 
immemorial the separation of powers has been seen to be essential to our democracy, and this 
Parliament must zealously safeguard the separation of powers”.213 His reservations, prima 
facie, have some legitimacy. 
 
It was Finlayson’s contention that the Council would have members of the judiciary 
undertaking functions that are more properly the role of the executive. For example, s 8(c) of 
the Sentencing Council Act requires the Council to produce guidelines “to inform members 
of Parliament and policymakers about sentencing and parole practice,” s 8(a)(iv) would have 
judges facilitating the provision of information to enable penal resources to be effectively 
managed, and s 9(d) requires them to give statements on the guidelines’ likely effect on the 
prison population. These, according to Finlayson, “are not legitimate functions of the 
judiciary”.214 The judiciary also expressed a level of concern, with the Chief Justice saying 
that what is proposed is a significant collaboration of the three separate branches of 
government to produce law, and that this is “right at the edge of what is constitutionally 
appropriate”.215 She viewed the Council as having two distinct purposes: to promote 
consistency in sentencing, but also in the “setting of wider social policies through sentencing 
guidelines and the provision to the Executive of estimates about their impact on prison 
population”.216 While the judiciary was well placed to assist in the former, the Chief Justice 
indicated that the judiciary had much less to contribute in relation to the latter. 
 
The judiciary217 recommended that the Bill therefore be modified to assuage concerns around 
the separation of powers. These included: making it clear that the executive cannot give 
directions to the Council; making it clear that it is still the role of the government, not the 
Council, to manage penal resources; ensuring that the guidelines would indeed act as simply 
guidance, and would not dictate the outcome in a particular case; and to provide for a senior 
judge to chair the Council, who can ensure that judges are not co-opted into policy making 
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beyond that which is consistent with the judicial function.218 All of these recommendations 
have since been adopted and are present, either implicitly or explicitly, in the Sentencing 
Council Act 2007. 
 
Any lingering concerns that the Council would require its judicial members to be engaged in 
social policy functions that are more properly the role of the executive have been addressed 
by Dr Warren Young, who headed the project at the Law Commission. He claims that judges 
have always had a role in developing social policy through the common law, and that the 
existence of the Council “merely makes the role of judges in developing social policy more 
transparent”.219 The contention that the Council will force judges to tackle fiscal issues is 
overstated, as their role is one step removed from actually implementing fiscal policy. The 
Council’s consideration of prison populations and fiscal policy merely accompanies the 
proposed guidelines, and aims to ensure that public debate around their implementation can 
be fully informed. The decision over whether or not to approve the guidelines is ultimately 
Parliament’s,220 and there is no suggestion that the guidelines would have to conform to 
prison population or budgetary constraints determined by the Government.221 
 
The Attorney-General also received advice from the Crown Law Office which concluded that 
a Sentencing Council would not be an affront to the separation of powers.222 Weight was 
placed on overseas jurisprudence,223 particularly the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Mistretta v United States,224 where the Court held that the guidelines issued by the federal 
Sentencing Commission were not unconstitutional and that the Commission did not breach 
the principle of separation of powers. Justice Blackmun, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court, said that:225 
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Congress’ decision to create an independent rulemaking body to promulgate sentencing 
guidelines and to locate the body within the Judicial Branch is not unconstitutional unless 
Congress has vested in the Commission powers that are more appropriately performed by the 
other Branches or that undermine the integrity of the Judiciary. 
 
It was held that the integrity of the judiciary was not undermined, nor were the Commission’s 
functions more appropriately that of another branch of government, despite them not being 
strictly judicial. Similarly, the functions of the New Zealand Sentencing Council have an 
executive “tinge,” because they involve the “provision of policy advice, informing Members 
of Parliament and policy makers, and informing and educating the public”.226 Whilst skirting 
close to the margins of the separation of powers, the Council is not unconstitutional as it 
remains an independent statutory body, and allows the judicial members to withdraw from 
participation in any of the Council’s functions if they consider them to be incompatible with 
their judicial office.227 
 
3 Should the guidelines have retrospective effect? 
 
It is a long held principle of the criminal law that where a penalty has been increased between 
the commission of an offence and sentencing, the offender is entitled to the lesser of the two 
penalties.228 This is underpinned by various other fundamental tenets of the criminal law: the 
principles of strict construction, minimum criminalisation, maximum certainty, and even the 
rule of law itself. 229 The New Zealand judiciary has strived to uphold this principle of non-
retrospectivity. The Court of Appeal has held that it is “at the forefront of a criminal justice 
system which is fair and just”,230 and Williams J in the High Court has said that non-
compliance with the principle is “repugnant to justice”.231 The legislature has enshrined the 
principle in both the Sentencing Act 2002232 and the Bill of Rights Act 1990,233 the 
provisions of which are identical and guarantee the offender “the right, if convicted of an 
offence in respect of which the penalty has been varied between the commission of the 
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offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser penalty”. This is consistent with New 
Zealand’s international obligations, particularly under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.234 Indeed, Parliament has given primacy to this principle by legislating 
that it applies despite any other enactment or rule of law.235 
 
However, the Law Commission recommended, and Parliament subsequently agreed, that the 
guidelines of the Sentencing Council be given retrospective effect.236 The Sentencing 
Amendment Act 2007 requires the sentencing judge to take into account an applicable 
guideline “whether or not the guideline was in force when the offence was committed”.237 
This is prima facie a contravention of the principle of non-retrospectivity, and means that 
offenders may be given a more punitive sentence under the guidelines than they would have 
received at the time they committed the offence.  
 
The matter was considered by the Crown Law Office when tendering advice to the Attorney-
General on the Criminal Justice Reform Bill’s consistency with the Bill of Rights Act.238 
They determined that there was no issue around the retrospective nature of the guidelines, 
basing their conclusion on the Supreme Court decision of Morgan v Superintendent of 
Rimutaka Prison.239 In Morgan, the majority of the Court had held that the protections found 
under s 25(g) of the Bill of Rights Act concerning retrospective penalties only relate to the 
variation of maximum penalties, and not to the individual sentence that might have been 
imposed on a particular offender. As such, the Crown Law Office said that “the retrospective 
nature of the sentencing and parole guidelines […] do not breach s 25(g) of the BORA 
because the provisions do not change the maximum penalty able to be imposed for any 
offence”.240  
 
It is interesting to note that the Chief Justice, in a letter to the Justice and Electoral Select 
Committee, implored the members “to ensure that no adverse retrospective effect results from 
the adoption of any guidelines”.241 The Law Commission, in a supplementary briefing paper 
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to the Committee, acknowledged the comments of the Chief Justice, but pointed out that she 
had dissented in the Morgan case, and that her views are therefore inconsistent with the 
leading New Zealand decision on the issue.242 In the same paper, the Commission argued that 
the principle against the retrospective application of the criminal law is only triggered when 
offenders are prejudiced, and that in practice the guidelines would benefit a large number of 
offenders.243 This was in part due to the simultaneous reforms being recommended for parole. 
A lower head sentence would be imposed, but a greater proportion of that sentence would 
need to be served before the offender would become eligible for release, thus achieving the 
desired ‘truth in sentencing’. For those offenders who would still suffer a detriment from the 
imposition of an issued guideline, the Commission emphasised that a sentencing judge can 
still depart from the guidelines as necessary on a case by case basis.244  
 
As such, it seems that the default position favours retrospectivity on the basis that in most 
situations the new guidelines will benefit offenders anyway. In those cases where it does not, 
the sentencing judge has discretion to depart from the guideline in the interests of justice. 
 
4 Hessell v R – Supreme Court attack on the guidelines 
 
In 2009, the New Zealand Court of Appeal took the opportunity to issue a guideline judgment 
on the appropriate level of discount that sentencing judges should apply for an early guilty 
plea.245 Until that point the Court had been reluctant to lay down any specific quantum for a 
discount,246 a situation which Chambers J described as “symptomatic of the courts’ general 
approach to sentencing, which vested judges with broad discretions”.247 Although there had 
been a slow shift towards more definitive guidelines on the issue since 2005,248 spurred on by 
s 8(e) of the Sentencing Act 2002,249 as well as a relevant guideline issued by the Sentencing 
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Guidelines Council in the United Kingdom,250 in practice this had only served to muddy the 
waters even further. Chambers J said that a guideline judgment clarifying the position in New 
Zealand would have been issued earlier, but the Court was expecting the situation to be 
remedied by the Sentencing Council instead. However, as it was apparent that the National-
led Government was not going to establish the Council in practice, the Court of Appeal 
resolved to resume their programme of issuing guideline judgments.251 
 
In constructing their judgment, the Court of Appeal placed considerable weight on the draft 
Guilty Pleas Guideline that had been formulated by the Sentencing Establishment Unit at the 
Law Commission as part of the inaugural guidelines.252 It also looked at the equivalent 
guideline that had been implemented by the Sentencing Guidelines Council in the United 
Kingdom, which Chambers J noted as having the same methodology as the New Zealand 
draft iteration.253 The full bench of the Court of Appeal decided that the Law Commission’s 
recommended approach (and, by extension, the approach in the United Kingdom) was “most 
desirable”,254 and implemented it accordingly.255 This was based in part on the assumption 
that Parliament, through its implementation of the Sentencing Act, had sought to curtail 
discretion in favour of a more structured approach to sentencing. An intricate analysis of the 
guideline falls outside the scope of this paper. It is enough to say that the Court of Appeal 
adopted a sliding scale of discount which turned on when the guilty plea was delivered; 
subsumed remorse as a mitigating factor into the guilty plea discount; and held that the 
strength of the prosecution case was an irrelevant consideration when determining the 
quantum of reduction. 
 
The decision was subsequently appealed, with the Supreme Court granting leave on the 
grounds of “whether the discount for the applicant’s guilty plea was appropriately given in 
accordance with sentencing principles and the Sentencing Act 2002”.256 The judgment of 
McGrath J, on behalf of a unanimous bench, was scathing of the Court of Appeal’s guideline 
                                                             
250 Sentencing Guidelines Council “Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea: Definitive Guideline” (United 
Kingdom, July 2007). 
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judgment.257 Although it did not attack the Law Commission guideline directly, for all intents 
and purposes an attack on the guideline judgment is an attack on the validity of the draft 
guideline itself. McGrath J said that the Court of Appeal had “underestimated the complexity 
of the issue” before them,258 noting that the approach adopted “would put pressure on an 
accused to plead guilty for reasons that are unprincipled,” thus creating an “unacceptable 
risk” that innocent persons will pleading guilty.259 Indeed, all aforementioned aspects of the 
guideline judgment were criticised and revised by the Supreme Court.   
 
Mark Shaw says that this is a reflection on the efficacy of the Sentencing Council, and 
indicates that (at least in the Supreme Court’s view) the “sentencing council may produce 
guidelines that are incompatible with basic criminal justice principles”.260 This may be 
unduly strong language, especially considering the significant input from the High Court 
judiciary at the Law Commission’s Sentencing Establishment Unit (who drafted the guideline 
in question). Nevertheless, it is proof that not all of the issued guidelines will be accepted by 
the judiciary, despite there being judicial input in their development. This is a major blow to 
any future attempts at establishing the Sentencing Council in practice, because it may be 
indicative of a lack of judicial “buy in” from the top levels of the New Zealand judiciary - 
something the Law Commission considered to be essential to the Council’s success.261 In 
light of this decision it seems that the Supreme Court would have no reservations about 
attacking those guidelines that it considers to be inconsistent with the Sentencing Act, which 
was the “ultimate difficulty” they had with the Court of Appeal’s approach.262 This problem 
would be exacerbated by the statutory requirement that the guidelines produced by the 
Council be consistent with the Sentencing Act.263 This could turn into a soft form of judicial 
strike down of unacceptable guidelines, whereby the upper levels of the judiciary interpret the 
guidelines so narrowly that they lose their effect, or alternatively, they encourage lower 
courts to depart from the ‘flawed’ guideline on a consistent basis.  
 
That said, the guidelines are primarily aimed at achieving consistency amongst the mass of 
less serious offences that are dealt with by the District Court. One would think that the judges 
                                                             
257 Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135. 
258 At [67]. 
259 At [60] and [72]. 
260 Shaw, above n 220, at 14. 
261 Law Commission, above n 21, at [83]. 
262 At [67]. 
263 Sentencing Council Act 2007, s 9(1)(a). 
41 
 
at this level are more likely to welcome guidance than their superior court brethren. However, 
this may not be the case. It is interesting to note that the affidavit evidence of several Crown 
Solicitors indicated that the Court of Appeal’s guideline judgment was not being evenly 
applied in the District Courts.  McGrath J said that in some regions “considerable latitude” is 
extended to defendants to receive the full discount of 33%, irrespective of where they fall on 
the Court of Appeal’s sliding scale, so long as the plea is entered before committal.264 More 
substantive research to establish the veracity of these claims would clearly be necessary, but 
it prima facie indicates that the implementation of the draft guideline prepared by the Law 
Commission would have little effect in ensuring consistency in sentencing, which was 
overriding purpose of a Sentencing Council in the first place. 
 
5 Fitzgerald v Muldoon – A modern day breach? 
 
The Sentencing Council Act has been on the statute books for over seven years, but the 
Council itself has yet to be established in practice. It is still awaiting the Executive Council to 
tender advice to the Governor-General, so that he can bring the body into force through 
Orders in Council.265 This situation raises “serious constitutional issues”.266 It is possible that 
the Government’s failure to make the Act operative is illegal, relying on the authority of 
Fitzgerald v Muldoon.267 At its most basic, the situation may amount to the executive 
refusing to implement laws passed by the legislature. 
 
In Fitzgerald v Muldoon, the Supreme Court held that the Prime Minister had acted 
unlawfully when he unilaterally abolished the New Zealand Superannuation Scheme 
established by the Superannuation Act 1974.  His actions contravened s 1 of the Bill of 
Rights Act 1688, which says that “the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the 
execution of laws, by regal authority without consent of Parliament, is illegal”. Only 
Parliament has the ability to make or unmake laws, and the executive does not have the 
power to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.268 
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Can the current Government’s inaction in implementing the Sentencing Council fall under 
this precedent? It is difficult. The precedent can immediately be distinguished on its facts: in 
Muldoon, the Prime Minister was suspending a law that was already functioning; here, the 
executive is failing to bring an Act into force. Indeed, the legislature has bestowed upon the 
executive a degree of discretion as to when the Sentencing Council will actually be 
implemented, as s 2 of the Act dictates that it is to be brought into force through Orders in 
Council. This is consistent with Standing Orders,269 thus adding a degree of legislative 
legitimacy. Alec Samuels agrees, saying that it is constitutionally acceptable for a statute not 
to have been brought into force after a very long delay, because “subject to any express 
provision to the contrary, the minister has a discretion whether or not to make an order but, 
nonetheless, he is under a duty to keep the situation under review”.270 
 
However, there is no indication that the Government has reviewed the need for a Sentencing 
Council in New Zealand, having issued no statement around the Council’s existence since its 
election campaign in 2008. The legislature would not pass legislation simply to have it 
languish indefinitely in abeyance between royal assent and Order in Council.  If the 
Government was not happy with the Act and had no intention of implementing it, it should 
introduce a Bill to Parliament to repeal it. It has not done so. There is therefore an arguable 
case for saying that the Government has in effect suspended the law without proper authority.   
 
VIII Conclusion 
 
Criminal sentencing is one of the most difficult and complex components of the legal system. 
This was aptly articulated by McArdle J, who said that “trying a case is as easy as falling off 
a log. The difficulty comes in knowing what to do with an accused once they have been 
found guilty”.271 Underlying this difficulty is a fundamental tension between individualised 
justice and consistency. Judges must be given some degree of discretion to tailor a sentence 
that is appropriate on the facts of the particular case, but at the same time, mechanisms need 
to exist to ensure what that like cases are treated alike. Finding the correct equilibrium is of 
fundamental importance, as it ensures both the integrity and legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system. 
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New Zealand has not yet found this equilibrium. There is a growing body of evidence 
highlighting extensive regional variations in sentences imposed, indicating that appellate 
guideline judgments and the principles and purposes of sentencing are insufficient to ensure 
consistency. The “dragon of arbitrary discretion” clearly needs a shorter leash.272 This would 
not be achieved by the intuitive synthesis approach to sentencing, which amounts to 
removing the leash entirely. Although this is the method used in Australia and Canada, it 
should not be followed in New Zealand as it removes much of the transparency in sentencing 
and in many ways normalises disparity. The approach also requires the existence of an 
overriding purpose of sentencing, or at least a clearly defined hierarchy thereof, of which 
New Zealand has neither. An alternative mechanism would be to introduce mandatory 
sentences, which would swiftly slay the dragon. Mandatory sentences may technically 
achieve consistency, but they come at the cost of individualised justice. The result would be 
for dissimilar cases to be treated alike, which is no better than the original problem that 
required fixing. Such an approach would also merely transfer discretion from judges to police 
and prosecutors, effectively giving less accountable bodies a greater role in the imposition of 
sentences. Furthermore, research in the United States suggests that prosecutors will lay less 
severe charges in order to mitigate against what could otherwise be an incredibly punitive 
system. 
 
It is clear then that the solution to the problem of inconsistent sentencing does not lie at the 
extremities. Indeed, the answer has been in plain sight since 2007, when the Sentencing 
Council Act was passed. The implementation of a Sentencing Council with a mandate to draft 
guidelines is the best way forward for New Zealand’s criminal justice system. The expertise 
and resources of the Council would ensure that coherence could be given to sentencing as a 
whole, leaving behind the piecemeal approach that currently exists in the form of appellate 
guideline judgments. Furthermore, the Council can fully cost all of its recommendations and 
forecast their likely effect on the prison population, which in turn would give the Government 
increased control over the Corrections budget. While there is a presumption that the 
guidelines would be followed, the proposed public interest test for departure would ensure 
that there is flexibility for sentencing judges to depart from the guidelines as necessary – 
finally achieving the desired equilibrium between individualised justice and consistency.   
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That said, the fate of the Sentencing Council looks dire. With the re-election of the centre-
right National Party, the Act is likely to continue to wallow on the statute books or find itself 
repealed entirely. This would be a bold move, as sentencing councils are becoming the norm 
in a range of comparable overseas jurisdictions. Furthermore, significant consultation went 
into the Act’s creation, receiving support from both the Law Commission and members of the 
wider judiciary.  If the Sentencing Council Act is not implemented then careful consideration 
must be given by the Government around what to replace it with, because the sentencing 
regime in New Zealand as it stands is unsatisfactory. A justice system that fails to ensure 
fairness and consistency will not long be worthy of the name. 
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